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A1 Activity of NIS accounts and suspect accounts
Figure A1 shows the activity of NIS accounts from June 2012 to December 2012 together
with a clustering derived from a block clustering algorithm. The algorithm identifies ac-
counts that have very similar activity patterns – i.e., they tweet on the same days – and
groups them together (Hartigan, 1972). For methodological details, see Keller, Schoch,
Stier, and Yang (2017).
Accounts are grouped according to four patterns of activity (see also Keller et al.,
2017): the accounts at the bottom of the plot are most distinct from the rest in that they are
very active and do not necessarily cease tweeting after December 11. A manual inspection
shows that they are at least partly automated and focus on tweeting news headlines. It is
possible that the principals forgot or were not able to shut them down or thought they were
innocuous enough to continue tweeting through the election.
The other three groups focus on retweeting other accounts: a small group is active from
the beginning of the observed period until September 1 (top of figure). A larger group starts
or massively increases its activity on September 1 and shuts down on December 11 (green
marked accounts).
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Figure A1: Activity of NIS accounts. Each line corresponds to the activity of a single
account. The darker the cell of a given day, the more tweets were sent. The colored lines
indicate cluster membership.
We also applied the block clustering technique to the 834 suspect accounts identified
(Figure A2). Most suspect accounts have similar activity patterns as the semi-automated
known NIS accounts and cease to tweet in the first week of October or beginning of
November (top part of the plot). Interspersed are a few accounts that also tweet from
the beginning, but stop around October 1, which resembles the pattern of a small group of
known NIS accounts as well. A small group of suspects follows the most common pattern
among known NIS accounts, starting on September 1 and stopping on December 11. In
addition, there a considerable number of suspect accounts (black cluster) that follow a pat-
tern of a handful of known NIS accounts which start tweeting at the end of the first week
of November, and either stop or continue on December 11.
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Figure A2: Activity of suspect accounts. Each line corresponds to the activity of a single
account. The darker the cell of a given day, the more tweets were sent. The colored lines
indicate cluster membership.
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A2 Overlap and similarities between different detection
methods
Table A1 shows the overlap between the different detection methods. The overlap is mod-
erate, but it should be kept in mind that the three different methods are designed to discover
three different message coordination strategies, and that the accounts do not all choose the
same strategy. The semi-automated accounts tend to focus on co-tweeting, while other ac-
counts almost only retweet other accounts. The three methods are therefore complements
instead of substitutes.
Table A1: Overlap among the three identification methods: number of suspects detected.
Row percentages.
retweet co-tweet co-retweet
retweet 204 (100%) 91 (45%) 121 (59%)
co-tweet 91 (14%) 647 (100%) 290 (44%)
co-retweet 121 (28%) 290 (67%) 432 (100%)
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A3 Additional results from the text analysis
Table A2: 50 most popular keywords used among NIS accounts, suspect accounts, random
sample, political sample, and opinion leaders. Proportions are caculated after preprocess-
ing texts of 10,000 randomly sampled tweets per group.
Rank NIS Prop NIS Suspects Prop Random sample Prop Political sample Prop Opinion leaders Prop
1 North Korea(북한) 1.10 Journalist (기자) 0.75 lol (ㅋㅋ) 1.15 GeunHye Park (박근혜) 1.49 GeunHye Park (박근혜) 0.72
2 Presidential election (대선) 0.41 Presidential election (대선) 0.73 crying emoji (ㅜㅜ) 0.41 JaeIn Moon (문재인) 1.12 Candidate (후보) 0.51
3 Korea (한국) 0.38 Saenuri (새누리) 0.66 Bot 0.29 ChulSoo Ahn (안철수) 1.07 ChulSoo Ahn (안철수) 0.46
4 Seoul (서울) 0.36 Candidate (후보) 0.65 GeunHye Park (박근혜) 0.25 Candidate (후보) 0.97 Vote (투표) 0.45
5 ChulSoo Ahn (안철수) 0.36 Seoul (서울) 0.60 I am (난) 0.23 President (대통령) 0.60 JaeIn Moon (문재인) 0.42
6 North Korea followers (종북) 0.35 North Korea(북한) 0.53 I am (내가) 0.23 Presidential election (대선) 0.53 Saenuri (새누리) 0.33
7 President (대통령) 0.34 GeunHye Park (박근혜) 0.50 @ 0.21 Citizens (국민) 0.52 Politics (정치) 0.32
8 Candidate (후보) 0.31 Congressman (의원) 0.47 Me (나) 0.19 Saenuri (새누리) 0.48 Citizens (국민) 0.30
9 Saenuri (새누리) 0.31 President (대통령) 0.46 lol (ㅎㅎ) 0.19 Vote (투표) 0.45 Presidential election (대선) 0.27
10 Journalist (기자) 0.28 ChulSoo Ahn (안철수) 0.44 JaeIn Moon (문재인) 0.19 Politics (정치) 0.40 lol (ㅋㅋ) 0.26
11 China (중국) 0.25 Minjutonghapdang (민주통합당) 0.43 For real (진짜) 0.17 Minjoodang (민주당) 0.33 President (대통령) 0.25
12 Japan (일본) 0.25 Korea (한국) 0.38 Candidate (후보) 0.17 Congressman (의원) 0.22 Korea (대한) 0.20
13 Citizens (국민) 0.25 Congress (국회) 0.34 ChulSoo Ahn (안철수) 0.17 Republic of Korea (대한민국) 0.21 Today (오늘) 0.18
14 GeunHye Park (박근혜) 0.24 This day (이날) 0.32 Today (오늘) 0.16 MooHyun Roh (노무현) 0.20 Minjoodang (민주당) 0.17
15 Congressman (의원) 0.24 Afternoon (오후) 0.30 Now (지금) 0.14 North Korea (북한) 0.19 Seoul (서울) 0.16
16 Government (정부) 0.23 JaeIn Moon (문재인) 0.30 Very (너무) 0.13 Congress (국회) 0.19 JungHee Park (박정희) 0.15
17 Politics (정치) 0.23 Primaries (경선) 0.27 RT 0.13 North Korea followers (종북) 0.18 Korea (한국) 0.15
18 U.S.A. (미국) 0.22 Government (정부) 0.27 Me too (나도) 0.11 Seoul (서울) 0.18 lol (ㅎㅎ) 0.13
19 Republic of Korea (대한민국) 0.22 Japan (일본) 0.27 President (대통령) 0.11 Korea (대한) 0.17 Congressman (의원) 0.13
20 JungEun Kim (김정은) 0.20 Past (지난) 0.24 Me (저) 0.11 JungHee Park (박정희) 0.17 I am (제가) 0.12
21 Military (군) 0.20 The North (北) 0.23 Vote (투표) 0.11 #PresidentialElection (#대선) 0.17 Most (가장) 0.11
22 Minjutonghapdang (민주통합당) 0.18 U.S.A. (미국) 0.23 crying emoji (ㅜㅜ) 0.11 Economy (경제) 0.15 Congress (국회) 0.11
23 Past (지난) 0.18 Morning (오전) 0.22 Korea (한국) 0.11 lol (ㅋㅋ) 0.15 Prosecutor (검찰) 0.11
24 JaeIn Moon (문재인) 0.18 Delegate (대표) 0.22 Now (이제) 0.10 Busan (부산) 0.13 I am (내가) 0.11
25 Korea (대한) 0.18 Politics (정치) 0.22 Citizens (국민) 0.10 Minjootonghapdang (민주통합당) 0.13 Nation (국가) 0.10
26 Congress (국회) 0.18 Stated (밝혔다) 0.21 Seoul (서울) 0.09 http 0.13 Now (지금) 0.10
27 The North (北) 0.17 Seoul=Yeonhap (서울=연합뉴스) 0.21 I am (나는) 0.09 Korea (한국) 0.13 MooHyun Roh (노무현) 0.10
28 Nation (국가) 0.17 China (중국) 0.21 Us (우리) 0.09 Today (오늘) 0.13 Very (너무) 0.10
29 Economy (경제) 0.17 Citizens (국민) 0.20 For real (정말) 0.08 Nation (국가) 0.11 I am (저는) 0.10
30 Afternoon (오후) 0.15 Police (경찰) 0.20 Politics (정치) 0.08 Us (우리) 0.11 Us (우리) 0.10
31 This day (이날) 0.15 Military (군) 0.19 Japan (일본) 0.08 Joint nomination (단일화) 0.10 Economy (경제) 0.10
32 Dokdo (독도) 0.14 Yeolin (열린) 0.19 ˆ 0.08 Military (군) 0.10 이제 0.10
33 Our (우리) 0.14 Korea (대한) 0.18 I am (제가) 0.08 #GeunHyePark (#박근혜) 0.10 Together (함께) 0.10
34 Police (경찰) 0.13 Seoul=Newsis (서울=뉴시스) 0.18 What (뭐) 0.08 Government (정부) 0.10 For real (정말) 0.10
35 Recently (최근) 0.13 Charge (혐의) 0.17 2 0.08 1 0.10 Same (같은) 0.10
36 Delegate (대표) 0.12 Recently (최근) 0.16 Again (다시) 0.07 Now (이제) 0.10 Japan (일본) 0.10
37 #kocon 0.12 Prosecutor (검찰) 0.16 Presidential election (대선) 0.07 MyungBak Lee (이명박) 0.09 Again (다시) 0.09
38 JungIl Kim(김정일) 0.12 Economy (경제) 0.16 Good (좋은) 0.07 Camp (캠프) 0.09 postposition (겁니다) 0.09
39 Morning (오전) 0.12 Dokdo (독도) 0.15 ˜ 0.07 Now (지금) 0.09 Military (군) 0.09
40 Charge (혐의) 0.12 Busan (부산) 0.15 Honey (오빠) 0.07 This time (이번) 0.09 Government (정부) 0.09
41 Primaries (경선) 0.11 MyongBak Lee (이명박) 0.14 I am (저는) 0.07 People (사람이) 0.09 1 0.09
42 Stated (밝혔다) 0.10 Nation (국가) 0.14 Tomorrow (내일) 0.07 Prosecutor (검찰) 0.09 Everyone (모두) 0.09
43 Missile (미사일) 0.10 JungEun Kim (김정은) 0.13 See (보고) 0.06 For real (정말) 0.09 North Korea(북한) 0.09
44 Busan (부산) 0.10 Minjoodang (민주당) 0.13 3 0.06 JungHee Lee (이정희) 0.09 People (사람이) 0.09
45 RT 0.10 Jeju (제주) 0.11 Like that (그렇게) 0.06 Primaries (경선) 0.08 Republic of Korea (대한민국) 0.08
46 Yeolin (열린) 0.10 First (첫) 0.11 Korea (대한) 0.06 Matador (비방) 0.08 Differnt (다른) 0.08
47 Jeju (제주) 0.09 Independent (무소속) 0.11 Saenuri (새누리) 0.06 Delegate (대표) 0.08 North Korea followers (종북) 0.08
48 MyungBak Lee 0.09 Minjoo (민주) 0.11 How (어떻게) 0.06 Together (함께) 0.08 What (무슨) 0.08
49 lol (ㅋㅋ) 0.09 Center (가운데) 0.10 Kr 0.06 Very (가장) 0.08 Big (큰) 0.08
50 Most (가장) 0.09 Running (출마) 0.10 The 0.06 Same (같은) 0.08 Immediately (바로) 0.08
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Table A3: 30 most retweeted Twitter accounts by NIS accounts, suspects, regular users,
political sample, and opinion leaders. nis subscript indicates that the retweeted account
is part of the NIS campaign.
Rank NIS % NIS suspects % Regular users % Political sample % Opinion leaders %
1 yark991 3.30% kangjaechon 0.83% pyein2 0.10% pyein2 1.45% welovehani 0.55%
2 pyein2 2.45% nk humanrights 0.66% oisoo 0.10% julka1024 0.79% mettayoon 0.53%
3 koreaspiritnana 2.16% darmduck 0.57% mettayoon 0.06% mettayoon 0.71% odoomark 0.41%
4 kangjaechon 1.84% pyein2 0.54% soohjc 0.06% machokkk 0.65% funronga 0.38%
5 nk humanrights 1.61% hosu7722 0.51% julka1024 0.05% supersniper1219 0.52% du0280 0.38%
6 hosu7722 1.49% junghoonyoon 0.45% funronga 0.05% at pgh 0.51% mindgood 0.37%
7 yoonjujin 1.38% koreaspiritnana 0.43% sbs3927 0.05% sexycat881 0.49% biguse 0.34%
8 junghoonyoon 1.32% yoonjujin 0.38% machokkk 0.05% anbjxotn 0.47% unheim 0.31%
9 freedomnorth 1.00% yark991 0.23% unheim 0.04% yoonjujin 0.45% dogsul 0.29%
10 bangmo 0.95% bangmo 0.14% yark991 0.04% andyou13 0.45% patriamea 0.25%
11 nudlenudlenis 0.86% hanirm 0.13% idol kadura bot 0.04% funronga 0.45% jhohmylaw 0.25%
12 darmduck 0.82% hotgoodid 0.12% supersniper1219 0.04% unheim 0.44% oisoo 0.24%
13 jogisicnis 0.74% hslee3601 0.06% yoonjujin 0.04% scartoon1 0.42% madhyuk 0.23%
14 shore0987nis 0.63% zmfpfmnis 0.06% at pgh 0.04% junghoonyoon 0.42% nodolbal 0.23%
15 hanirm 0.52% ourholykorea 0.05% du0280 0.03% du0280 0.41% sewoosil 0.21%
16 ourholykorea 0.47% nudlenudlenis 0.05% welovehani 0.03% koreaspiritnana 0.39% truthtrail 0.20%
17 hansuyon19 0.44% humordelivery89nis 0.04% sexycat881 0.03% kooceo 0.37% viewnnews 0.20%
18 wlcodh 0.42% oisoo 0.04% andyou13 0.03% oisoo 0.35% histopian 0.20%
19 zmfpfmnis 0.38% taesan4nis 0.04% hanaag1006 0.03% twitteist 0.34% actormoon 0.19%
20 sisament 0.37% dlarkwnis 0.04% koreaspiritnana 0.03% patriamea 0.31% saveourmbc 0.19%
21 yunheesung 0.35% shore0987nis 0.04% patriamea 0.03% welovehani 0.31% newstapa 0.18%
22 taesan4nis 0.32% 1004pansoo 0.03% anbjxotn 0.03% iamegg3 0.29% pyein2 0.18%
23 seokyoungduk 0.32% omajuedanis 0.03% thekey16 0.03% neccyber1390 0.28% kyunghyang 0.18%
24 kiminhye0 0.31% rhanzhdnis 0.03% haeminsunim 0.03% jbkim8888 0.27% kyung0 0.18%
25 naya2816 0.29% enhance81nis 0.03% junghoonyoon 0.03% yark991 0.25% tak0518 0.17%
26 hslee3601 0.28% kimjun283nis 0.02% scartoon1 0.03% actormoon 0.25% ohmynews korea 0.17%
27 enhance81nis 0.27% jogisicnis 0.02% artist kadura b 0.03% darmduck 0.25% sungsooh 0.17%
28 kangminy99 0.27% tellatoznis 0.02% woqjf012 0.03% maestrok1 0.25% impeter701 0.16%
29 humordelivery89nis 0.26% coffe kimnis 0.02% ibgdrgn 0.03% wontwowin 0.25% baltong3 0.16%
30 kimjungaaa 0.26% nobigdeal00nis 0.02% neccyber1390 0.03% ruready88 0.23% mediamongu 0.16%
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A4 Robustness Checks
This section is devoted to several robustness checks concerning our detection strategies
and to better characterize the behavior of NIS accounts.
A4.1 Varying thresholds and time windows when detecting suspect
accounts
In the main text, we flagged accounts as suspicious if they retweet NIS accounts in more
than 50% of their total retweets, or if they are on the same co-tweet and co-retweet network
component as a known NIS account, where the co-tweets or co-retweets have to occur
within one minute. The following figures will show that selecting reasonably smaller or
larger thresholds would not change the main results.
Figure A3 illustrates the fraction of co-(re)tweets captured if we choose a different
time window than the one-minute interval selected. Specifically, it shows the number of
unique pairs of co-(re)tweeting NIS accounts captured as a fraction of all unique pairs of
co-(re)tweeting NIS accounts in our dataset.
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Figure A3: Fraction of unique pairs of NIS account co-tweeting (left panel) and co-
retweeting (right panel) within a specific time window.
While the great majority of co-tweets happens within one minute, only 20% of all co-
retweets occur in this time window. As argued in the main text, we have good reasons for
nevertheless choosing one minute as threshold for co-retweets. First, message coordination
should happen within a short time window if the goal is to amplify the specific tweet.
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Retweets occurring hours or days later may still increase the impact, but they do not help
starting a viral campaign. In addition, many accounts that co-retweet a message may do so
simply because they follow the same account and (independently) find the message worth
retweeting. We therefore do not consider co-retweets which are days apart as suspicious
as co-retweets that occur within the same minute.
Figure A4 shows the number of detected suspect accounts for different thresholds.
The number and identity of the suspects remains largely unchanged until the time window
approaches 9-10 minutes. At that point, we start including an increasingly large number of
regular users – many of which may well have nothing to do with the campaign at all, but
simply happen to follow and occasionally retweet the same accounts, or post one common
tweet that many other users tweet as well.
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Figure A4: Number of detected suspects for co-tweeting (left panel) and co-retweeting
(right panel) within a specific time window.
Turning to the detection via a large proportion of retweeting of known NIS accounts,
Figure A5 shows the number of flagged accounts if the threshold of 50% is altered. There
are two reasons for choosing this threshold. First, it is a quite natural choice since it implies
that an account is suspicious if it retweets NIS accounts more frequently than others. A
more practical reason is illustrated in the figure. While the number of suspicious accounts
does only increase slightly up to 50%, it starts growing faster afterwards, indicating that
the set of suspect accounts then includes too many false positives.
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Figure A5: Number of suspicious accounts detected if retweet threshold is altered. Note
that the x-axis is reversed.
A4.2 Detection accuracy
Our outlined detection strategy via the retweet and co-(re)tweet networks does not lend
itself for a rigorous accuracy analysis since there are no training steps involved to calibrate
parameters. Nevertheless, we employed the following simple test to measure the perfor-
mance of our detection strategy. We split the set of known NIS accounts into a training set
(80%) and a test set (20%). We apply our detection steps with the training set as known
accounts with the goal to recover the remaining test accounts. In other words: we examine
whether the known NIS accounts in the test set are located in the same connected com-
ponents as the known NIS accounts in the training set, or if they meet a 50%-threshold
of retweeting known NIS accounts. This procedure is repeated 20 times with random-
ized training and test sets. On average, 85% of the test accounts are detected again. Note
though, that the set of known NIS accounts includes many accounts that tweet less than
50 times in the whole period. These accounts are hard to detect with any strategy but also
have a negligible impact on the campaign as a whole.
A4.3 Network statistics
The following tables show basic statistic for the NIS networks examined in the main text
and compares them to those of the equivalent networks constructed among a random set of
9
users of equal size. The values for the random sample rows are averaged over 5,000 draws,
one time for the complete dataset and once for the dataset restricted to political keywords.
The political keywords include the names of the candidates and key political actors, event-
related keywords, as well as other general political keywords defined by Song, Kim, and
Jeong (2014).
Table A4: Statistics for retweet networks
Type unique pairs density
random samples (all) 14 0.0001
random samples (pol. tweets) 23 0.002
NIS 12412 0.0187
Table A5: Statistics for co-tweet networks
Type unique pairs density
random samples (all) <1 <0.0001
random samples (pol. tweets) 2.4 0.0005
NIS 1093 0.121
Table A6: Statistics for co-retweet networks
Type unique pairs density
random samples (all) <1 <0.0001
random samples (pol. tweets) 2.6 0.0008
NIS 4654 0.023
Irrespective of whether we look at the retweet, cotweet or co-retweet network, the NIS
accounts exhibit a much denser coordination pattern than the random users.
A4.4 Impact analysis
Figure A6 reproduces our findings on the impact of NIS accounts in terms of retweets
received, using only tweets with political keywords. Even the political tweets of NIS ac-
counts do rarely get retweeted and make up a negligible fraction of the retweets in our
dataset.
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Figure A6: Received political retweets by different groups of users. (a) only includes
known NIS accounts and (b) includes suspect users in the group of NIS accounts.
We also examine the impact of NIS accounts by examining whether the NIS was suc-
cessful in boosting the impact of like-minded accounts by retweeting them: do regular
users follow the lead and retweet those accounts as well? If this is the case, we should
expect two patterns: we should see an increase of retweets of like-minded accounts in our
sample of random and political tweets, in particular after the NIS campaign ramps up on
September 1, and possibly a drop after the campaign got revealed. We may also observe
that the retweet patterns of other Twitter users are similar to that of the NIS accounts.
To test this idea, we compare in Figure A7 how often these like-minded accounts were
retweeted by NIS accounts, NIS suspects, and opinion leaders, and how often the retweets
of the like-minded accounts appeared in a random and a political sample.
Figure A7 does not show any signs of a retweet propagation by NIS. Although a fair
amount of retweets of those like-minded accounts were found in other samples, the pat-
terns of retweeting are more similar to each other than to the known NIS accounts. We also
see no noticeable lasting change in the number of retweets of these like-minded accounts
in the random and political samples after the the sudden shutdown of the campaign. If the
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NIS was indeed successfully boosting these accounts, then the disappearance of such sup-
port should presumably reduce the number of retweets these supported accounts receive
from other users. The only drop in retweets received is – unsurprisingly – among the NIS
and NIS suspects themselves, which, having been shut down, cannot retweet anymore.
There is a steady increase of retweets received over time, but the most noteable increase
occurs just before September 1, and there is a general increase of tweets over time in our
dataset anyway.
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Figure A7: Retweet counts of the Twitter accounts retweeted by NIS. The counts are log-
transformed values.
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A5 Dataset statistics
Table A7: Statistics of the dataset
Type tweets retweets retweets/tweets
All 86,980,130 15,745,090 18%
NIS 194,190 93,519 48%
political 5,840,159 4,272,576 73%
NIS political 77,798 43,601 56%
A6 Comparison with other detection methods
We are not aware of existing methods that allow for the detection of disinformation. There
is, however, a growing literature on bot detection in computer science. Yet, it should be
noted that there are considerable conceptual differences between (the detection of) bots
and astroturfing accounts. There are plenty of bots that are not part of a secret influence
campaign, but simply aggregate news on a specific topic, or inform followers of the current
weather, for instance. Many social science studies purporting to study and identify bots are
thus in fact interested only in a subset of bots: those involved in astroturfing campaigns.
On the other hand, we also know that most astroturfing campaigns do not just employ
automated accounts, but instead use a mix of automation and posting by humans – some-
times in the same account (Grimme, Assenmacher, & Adam, 2018). Researchers using
bot detection algorithms to study astroturfing therefore succumb to a conceptual mismatch
between what they want to study and what they actually measure.
Our relational detection method is based on metrics derived from group-based behavior
of accounts, irrespective of whether the behavior is automated or not, and therefore is
designed to measure the actual concept of interest, astroturfing campaigns. Still, we will
compare the two approaches here – also to illustrate the problems with using bot detection
to identify astroturfing campaigns.
The Botometer (formerly BotOrNot), created by a team of academics from the Indiana
University, is most frequently used by social scientists studying Twitter.1 The algorithm
uses a plethora of account-level and context information (such as device used, or geolo-
cation) to assign each account examined a probability that it is automated. Since we lack
many of the variables needed and cannot get this data for the already deleted NIS accounts,
we cannot compare our detection method to the Botometer.
1https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
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We can, however, evaluate our findings against a commonly used method for detect-
ing highly automated accounts. Howard and Kollanyi (2016) have argued in a series of
publications that accounts posting more than 50 tweets per day on average should be con-
sidered highly automated, i.e., social bots. In a 10% sample of all tweets, this converts to a
threshold of 5 tweets per day. Of the 702 NIS accounts in our dataset, only 94 would thus
be flagged as highly automated. A manual inspection reveals that this roughly captures the
group of NIS accounts spreading newspaper headlines only, but misses the other accounts
– despite the fact that they also rely on automation to post retweets. The approach fares
better with the suspect accounts, where 511 of 834 meet the threshold. However, it also
identifies 14,522 additional accounts as highly automated. These may well be social bots,
but they are unlikely to be part of the NIS campaign. We take this as evidence that our re-
lational approach is preferable to methods focusing on automation by individual accounts
in isolation.
A7 Complete co-(re)tweet networks
Figures A8 and A9 show the complete co-(re)tweet networks of the dataset with a one
minute threshold.
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Figure A8: Complete co-tweet network with one minute threshold. Only components with
more than five nodes are shown to reduce clutter. Known NIS accounts are shown in red.
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Figure A9: Complete co-retweet network with one minute threshold. Only components
with more than five nodes are shown to reduce clutter. Known NIS accounts are shown in
red.
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